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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely used
in the fields such as natural language processing, computer vision
and image recognition. But several studies have been shown that
deep neural networks can be easily fooled by artificial examples
with some perturbations, which are widely known as adversarial
examples. Adversarial examples can be used to attack deep neural
networks or to improve the robustness of deep neural networks.
A common way of generating adversarial examples is to first
generate some noises and then add them into original examples.
In practice, different examples have different noise-sensitive. To
generate an effective adversarial example, it may be necessary to
add a lot of noise to low noise-sensitive example, which may make
the adversarial example meaningless. In this paper, we propose
a noise-sensitivity-analysis-based test prioritization technique to
pick out examples by their noise sensitivity. We construct an
experiment to validate our approach on four image sets and two
DNN models, which shows that examples are sensitive to noise
and our method can effectively pick out examples by their noise
sensitivity.
Index Terms—test prioritization, noise sensitivity, deep neural
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning [1] have been used in the fields including
molecular genetic studies [2], brain science [3], drug discovery
[4], medical diagnosis [5], mobile application [6], financial
transaction [7], and so on. Among all the deep learning
techniques, deep neural networks (DNNs) are one of the most
popular techniques and have shown excellent results in speech
recognition [8], [9], image recognition [10], natural language
processing [11]. Many researchers have focused on developing
deep neural network models [12], [13], [14], [15]. Moreover,
many open source libraries/frameworks [16], [17], [18], [19],
[20] for DNNs are available online.
In computer vision, the capabilities of deep neural network
techniques are even similar to that of human in image recog-
nition [21]. Although there are more and more DNN models
have been proposed, all of those models heavily depend on the
given set of samples since DNNs are actually an effective data
representation of a given set of samples. Therefore, a trained
DNN models may fail to classify a new sample correctly
in practice. It is very important to know that whether a
DNN model is reliable enough to be used. There are several
studies which try to expose the potential errors in a DNN
model by adversarial examples. An adversarial example is
an example which the given DNN models cannot classify it
correctly. Syegedy et al. [22] find several interesting interesting
properties of DNNs which help to launch adversarial attacks
on the DNNs models for image recognition. Later, researchers
have found that they can add noise into original examples to
generate adversarial examples for improving the robustness of
a DNN model or attacking a DNN model. Goodfellow et al.
[23] proposed a framework to estimate generative models via
an adversarial process, and many variants have been proposed.
They are called generative adversarial networks (GANs),
which is a popular way to generate adversarial examples.
Zhang et al. [24] proposed an unsupervised framework to
generate semantic-equivalent adversarial examples, which are
used to test the consistency of autonomous driving systems
across different scenes. Tian et al. [25] proposed DeepTest,
which can generate realistic synthetic images by applying
image transformations, scale, shear and rotation on original
images. Akhtari et al. [26] have investigated other adversarial
attacks [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32].
To generate an effective adversarial example1, it needs to
generate a lot of noises for adding to the original examples
before they succeed obtaining an effective adversarial example.
The number of noises to generate an adversarial example can
be enormous. Moreover adversarial examples with too much
noise can be easily detected by a defense model. For example,
Akhtar et al. [33] proposed a defense framework against
the adversarial attacks generated using universal perturbations
[32].
In practice, we observe that different original examples can
have different noise sensitivity. Examples with high noise
sensitivity are more likely to become adversarial examples
by perturbations. To increase the proportion of effective ad-
versarial examples in all adversarial examples, high noise-
sensitive example should be picked out, which are added noise
to generate adversarial examples. In this paper, we propose
a noise-sensitivity-analysis-based test prioritization technique
(NSATP) to detect high noise-sensitive examples in DNN
models with probability labels. First, NSATP collects the
probability vectors of original examples in deep neural net-
work. Then, NSATP uses the distance of the probability vec-
tors to compute the noise-sensitive values of original examples.
Finally, NSATP ranks the original examples according to their
noise-sensitive values. We use three types of distances in this
1In this paper, adversarial example refers to the example, which is generated
by adding noise to original example, and effective adversarial example refers
to the adversarial example, which can fool the deep neural network
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paper, namely probability difference, probability entropy and
probability-variance. We construct an experiment to validate
the effectiveness of NSATP on four image datesets and two
deep neural network models. The experimental results show
the example is sensitive to noise, the higher noise sensitivity
of an example is, the more NSATP it is likely to generate
an adversarial example with it, and the results based on
probability difference is more effective than that based on
probability entropy and probability variance.
The main contribution of our work is fourfold. First, we
confirmed that the example is sensitive to noise, and adding
the same noise, high noise-sensitive examples are easier to
fool the deep neural network than low noise-sensitive ex-
amples with the same noise. Second, we proposed a noise-
sensitivity-analysis-based test prioritization technique, which
can effectively pick out the examples by their noise sensitivity.
Third, we conducted an experiment on four image datasets and
two deep neural network models to validate the effectiveness
of NSATP. Fourth, probability-difference distance is more
effective than probability-entropy distance and probability-
variance distance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
uses the observations on two images to show that the example
may be sensitive to noise and motivate our work. Section III
presents our approach in detail, which is evaluated in Section
IV. Then we introduce related work in Section V. Finally, we
conclude our work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we first present adversarial attacks. Based
on it, we discuss the observation on two image to motivate
our work.
A. Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Deep neural networks are mainly driven by models and
data, which are used to solve some challenging tasks. Related
studies [22], [23], [27], [28] show that deep neural networks
still have vulnerabilities, which can be fooled by adversarial
examples. There are some common ways to generate adver-
sarial examples, such as adding noise into original examples
and example transformation.
The existence of adversarial examples has been pointed out
by Szegedy et al. [22]. Given an trained model C, an valid
input x and the target t, some noise are added into x to
generate an valid input x′, of which the target are the same as
that of x, but C(x) 6= C(x′). This example x′ is known as an
effective adversarial example. The distance metric is used to
quantify similarity between x and x′. One main goal of related
algorithms [23], [30], [27], [29] is to generate an adversarial
example x′ with a small distance from x.
Since the discovery of adversarial examples for the deep
neural networks [22], many works focus on the robustness of
neural networks against these adversarial examples and show
that using adversarial examples as training can improve the
robustness of neural networks. Akhtar et al. [33] proposed a
defense framework appending a pre-input layers against the
adversarial attacks. adversarial examples with too much noise
are easily identified by defense mechanism. There are some
defense mechanism that limit the number of attacks, such as
Alipay’s face authentications.
Label:4
(a) label 4 (81%)
Label:4
(b) label 4 (95%)
Fig. 1: Two Original Images
B. Observation
Label:4
(a) Orig. 1
Label:2
(b) adver. 1
Label:2
(c) adver. 2
Label:8
(d) adver. 3
Label:2
(e) adver. 4
Label:8
(f) adver. 5
Label:9
(g) adver. 6
Label:2
(h) adver. 7
Label:2
(i) adver. 8
Fig. 2: Adversarial examples of Fig. 1 (a)
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(a) Orig. 2
Label:0
(b) adver. 1
Label:6
(c) adver. 2
Label:6
(d) adver. 3
Label:9
(e) adver. 4
Label:6
(f) adver. 5
Fig. 3: Adversarial Examples of Fig. 1 (b)
Convolutional neural networks are a special kind of multi-
layer neural networks, which are trained with a version of the
back-propagation algorithm. LeNet [34] is one convolutional
network designed for handwritten and machine-printed char-
acter recognition.
We use MNIST [35] to train LeNet-5 model, and
randomly choose two pictures showed in Fig. 1.
LeNet-5 outputs that the probability vectors of the
two pictures are 〈0, 0, 0, 0.18, 0.81, 0, 0, 0, 0.01, 0〉 and
〈0, 0, 0, 0, 0.95, 0.01, 0, 0, 0.01, 0.03〉, respectively. We
randomly choose 2 × 2 pixels and reverse the value of each
pixel in each picture. We repeat it to generate 50 adversarial
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Fig. 4: Workflow of Our Method
examples for each pictures. There are 8 and 5 effective
adversarial examples with respect to the two pictures of
Fig. 1, showed in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. We have the observation
that the number of effective adversarial examples with respect
to Fig. 1 (a) is bigger than that with respect to Fig. 1 (b).
We repeat 10 times to observe the difference between the
numbers of effective adversarial examples with respect to
Fig. 1 (a) and Fig. 1 (b), and we find the numbers of effective
adversarial examples with respect to Fig. 1 (a) is always not
less than that with respect to Fig. 1 (b). We further observe
the probability vectors of the two pictures, and the probability
values of each label of Fig. 1 (b) are more discretized than
that of Fig. 1 (a). For example, the probability vector variance
(0.80) of Fig. 1 (b) is more than that (0.59) of Fig. 1 (a), and
the probability difference (0.95 − 0.03 = 0.92) of Fig. 1 (b)
between 1st probability and 2nd probability is more than that
(0.81 − 0.18 = 0.73) of Fig. 1 (a). The observation shows
that the examples are sensitive to noise, which motivates
us to consider whether the noise sensitivity is related to
probability vectors, and whether probability vectors can be
used to evaluate the noise sensitivity of given examples.
III. TECHNIQUE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our method NSATP to compute
the noise sensitivity of each examples and rank examples by
their noise sensitivity. Our method is designed for choosing
the original examples before generating adversarial examples
based on original examples to attack deep neural networks or
improve the robustness of deep neural networks.
A. Problem Settings
A neural network can be seen as a function F (x) = y,
where x denotes the input and y denotes the output (x ∈ R
and y ∈ R). In this paper we focus on deep neural networks
with the capabilities of n-class classification. The networks use
the softmax function to compute the output of the network, and
the output vector p satisfies pi ≥ 0 and ∑i=ni=1 pi = 1.
Let us consider a train set TS and a deep neural network
models C0, of which the outputs are the probability labels. All
examples of TS can be used to train the model C0 to generate
a trained a trained model C1 with n probability vectors. For a
valid input example ti ∈ TS, the trained model C1 can output
the probability vector of ti, i.e., 〈p1i , p2i , . . . , pni 〉.
Suppose that there is a example set S (i.e., 〈s1, s2, . . . , sm〉),
which is used to generate adversarial examples, and the
method AF of adding noise to S is available. For a ex-
ample si ∈ S, AF can generate k(k ≥ 1) examples (i.e.,
〈s1i , s2i , . . . , ski 〉), which are used to attack the trained model
C1 or improve the robustness of the trained model C1.
B. Our Method NSATP
Since our method (named NSATP) is to evaluate the noise
sensitivity of each example in S based on their probability
vectors computed by the trained model C1, the probability
vectors of evaluated examples should be available. Our method
workflow is depicted in Fig. 4.
Previous related works [22], [23], [27] focused on how to
generate effective adversarial examples based on one given
example, but example may be sensitive to noise. adding too
much noise to low noise-sensitive example to generate effec-
tive adversarial examples may make the adversarial example
meaningless or be easily detected by the defense mechanism.
NSATP aims to assess the noise sensitivity of examples
and pick out the high noise-sensitive examples before attack
models generate adversarial examples.
To start such a process, we assume that a trained models
C1 is ready showed in pre-step of Fig. 4, and the examples S
is also ready before applying NSATP. NSATP four steps, as
illustrated in the Fig. 4.
Step 1: Input S into C1 to collect the probability vectors
of each si ∈ S;
Step 2: Use a distance metric to evaluate the probability
vectors of each si;
Step 3: Generate a ranking list based on the results of step
2;
Step 4: Map the ranking list of step 3 and S to generate
the ranked example list based on S.
Previous related works [22], [23], [27] focused on the step
5 of Fig. 4, which randomly selected examples from S and
ignored the noise sensitivity of examples in S. Then, they used
the generated adversarial examples to attack C1 or improve the
robustness of C1.
PD =
i=n−1∑
i=1
(p′i − p′i+1)
i
(1)
PV =
i=n∑
i=1
(p′i − p)2 (2)
PE = −
i=n∑
i=1
p′i log p′i (3)
The selection of distance metrics is crucial to our method.
Based on the observation in Section II-B, the distance metric
is evaluated the noise sensitivity of one example based on
the difference between the probability vectors of the example.
Suppose we are given one probability vector 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉,
we use probability difference (PD), probability variance (PV)
and probability entropy (PE) to compute the noise sensitivity,
respectively. The probability difference is the sum of the differ-
ences between different sorting levels with different weights.
We first rank each value of the given probability vector to gen-
erate a ranked vector 〈p′1, p′2, . . . , p′n〉 by descending order,
then compute the difference between two adjacent numbers
of the ranked vector and mark the weight from 11 to
1
n−1 ,
finally calculate the sum of all difference with their weights.
The PD calculation is given in Equation 1. The variance is
used to measure the dispersion of one given data set. We
use the variance metric to measure the dispersion between
values in one given probability vector. The PV calculation
is given in Equation 2. Entropy can be used to evaluate the
uncertainty of random variables, and the probability values of
the example can be seen as random variables. In this paper
we call it probability entropy. The PE calculation is given in
Equation 3.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe set the experiment and
train the models on which we evaluate our method. Then, we
introduce some metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of our
method. Finally, we present the data analysis and the results
of the experiment.
A. Research Questions
Regarding our obversactions in Section II and our proposal,
we are desired to answer the following questions.
Q 1: Whether are examples sensitive to noise, and is there a
relationship between noise sensitivity and probability
vectors?
Q 2: If Q2 is ”yes”, is our method effective to analyze
the noise sensitivity of examples than the standard
random manner?
Q 3: If Q3 is ”yes”, which distance is better to evaluate the
the noise sensitivity of examples?
B. Experimental Setup
Similar to Su et al. [28], we encode the perturbation into
an array which is optimized by differential evolution. In our
experiment each perturbation holds x-y coordinates and RGB
value of the perturbation, and one perturbation modifies four
(2× 2) pixels.
We train two network models on MNIST, fashion-MNIST
(Shorted in f-MNIST), CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 classifica-
tion tasks, respectively. The model architecture is given in
Table I and the hyperparameters selected in Table II. In our
paper, we use the all training sets of the four datasets to
traning DNN models, and use the test sets of the four datasets
to analyze the noise sensitivity of examples and answer the
research questions.
C. Performance Measurement
In this section, we will introduce some metrics used to
evaluate the effectiveness of NSATP.
1) Effective adversarial sample ratio (Eff.): Evaluating the
effectiveness of adversarial examples is an important way
to compare the effectiveness of different adversarial attack
techniques. The more the effectiveness of adversarial examples
is, the less cost it is to successfully attack DNNs. In this paper,
to measure the noise-sensitivity of examples, we compute how
many adversarial samples fool the given deep neural network
among given adversarial sample set. For example, given an
example s and a deep neural network, an attack model generate
m adversarial samples, of which n samples can fool the given
deep neural network, and the nosie-senstivity of s is nm .
2) F-measure: F-measure [36] is widely used to evaluate
the effectiveness of different methods in adaptive testing and
security testing. F-measure denotes how many test cases are
executed before successfully attacking the system. To measure
performance the advantages in effectiveness of NSATP to
Random, we follow [27], [36] to use the F-measure metric. F-
measure calculates the expected number of adversarial sample
required to successfully fool the given deep neural network.
In other words, a lower F-measure value means that fewer
adversarial samples are used to accomplish the task. If an
attack strategy yields a lower F-measure value, it is considered
to be more effective. We expect a lower F-measure value
for NSATP than that of Random. We thus calculate Inc. =
R−A
R ×100% to evaluate the effectiveness improvement, where
R and A stand for the effectiveness of Random and NSATP
in F-Measure, respectively. The greater the value is, the more
effective NSATP is than Random.
3) Effectiveness on distance metric(Eff-D): In our frame-
work, it can use any distance metric, which can be used to
evaluate the probability vectors. In this paper, we use three
different distance metrics to compute the noise sensitivity
of given examples. To evaluate the effectiveness of different
ranks, we can fit their curve functions and map them to linear
functions, then use the absolute derivative of linear functions
to evaluate the effectiveness of different ranks. First, for a
given distance metric, we use our framework to obtain a tuple
〈v,E〉 for an given example, where v denotes the distance
TABLE I: Model Architectures
Net-1 Net-2
Layer Type MNIST f-MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 MNIST f-MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 3× 3× 32 3× 3× 32 3× 3× 32 3× 3× 32
Max Pooling 3× 3 3× 3 3× 3 3× 3 2× 2 2× 2 2× 2 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 3× 3× 32 3× 3× 32 3× 3× 32 3× 3× 32
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 5× 5× 64 - - - -
Max Pooling 3× 3 3× 3 3× 3 3× 3 2× 2 2× 2 2× 2 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 512
Fully Connected + ReLU 192 192 192 192 - - - -
SoftMax 10 10 10 100 10 10 10 100
TABLE II: Model Architectures
Layer Type MNIST f-MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
learning rate 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01
Batch Size 512 512 512 512
Epochs 20 20 60 60
value of the probability vector of the given example and E
denotes the noise sensitivity of the given example. Then, we
use the tuple set to fit a curve function. For different distance
metric on one example set, we can fit different curve with
95% correlation coefficient. Third, we map the curve function
to a linear function, and compute the derivative of each fitted
linear function. Finally, we compare the absolute values of
different derivatives to analyze which distance metric is better.
The more the absolute value is, the better the corresponding
distance metric is.
D. Data Analysis and Results
We report our experiment results in three subsections to
answer the three research questions, respectively.
1) Answer Q1: To answer Q1, we trained two DNN models
on four image datasets, and for given test examples collected
their noise sensitivity by three distance metrics, respectively.
Moreover, for each given examples, we use attack models
to generate 100 adversarial examples, and these adversarial
examples are evaluated by Eff. metric. We use the collected
data to generate the tuple set, and each tuple includes the
distance value and the Eff. value for one example.
We visualize each tuple set in a x-y coordinate figure. In
our experiment, there are four image datasets,three distance
metrics and two DNN models, therefore, we can obtain 24
(4×3×2) figures showed in Fig. 6 and Fig. 5. Fig. 6 shows the
Net-1 results on four image datasets, three distance metrics,
respectively. Fig. 6 shows the Net-2 results on four image
datasets, three distance metrics, respectively.
Let us take Fig. 6 (a) for discussion first. Fig. 6 (a) shows the
tuple distribution of MNIST on PD metric. The value of Eff.
decreases as the value of PD increases. The distribution of Fig.
6 (a) conforms to the exponential distribution. We use least
squares and variable substitution to fit a curve function with
more than 95% correlation coefficient between the function
and data. We further observe other distribution of each tuple
set, which also conforms to the exponential distribution, and
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Fig. 5: The Results of Net-2
we fit a function with more than 95% correlation coefficient
for each dataset on each metric. all fitted functions and
the correlation coefficient are summarized in Table III and
Table IV. We check all figures and obtain the relationship
between Eff. values and the distance values is nonlinear-
inverse proportion.
Finally, we answer Q1 as follows:
TABLE III: Summary on Fitted Functions
Net-2 Net-1
PD PE PV PD PE PV
MNIST f(x) = 0.27e−3.87x f(x) = 0.27e−3.81x f(x) = 0.27e−3.86x f(x) = 0.49e−90.37x f(x) = 0.43e−74.28x f(x) = 0.47e−84.28x
f-MNIST f(x) = 0.39e−3.18x f(x) = 0.38e−3.11x f(x) = 0.39e−3.16x f(x) = 0.47e−13.27x f(x) = 0.42e−10.80x f(x) = 0.45e−12.31x
Cifar-10 f(x) = 0.14e−3.87x f(x) = 0.14e−4.00x f(x) = 0.14e−3.95x f(x) = 0.42e−20.76x f(x) = 0.22e−8.88x f(x) = 0.27e−11.46x
Cifar-100 f(x) = 0.23e−1.56x f(x) = 0.24e−1.64x f(x) = 0.24e−1.61x f(x) = 0.43e−8.52x f(x) = 0.31e−5.42x f(x) = 0.36e−6.53x
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Fig. 6: The Results of Net-1
A1: The examples are sensitive to noise, and the noise
sensitivy and the distance of probability vectors are
exponential relationships.
2) Answer Q2: The effectiveness of NSATP and Random
in revealing adversarial attack on one DNN are evaluated using
the F-measure metrics. The experiment results of NSATP and
Random in F-Measure on four image datasets and two models
are shown in Table V. To answer Q2, we randomly select 1000
TABLE IV: The Correlation Coefficient between Functions
and Data Distribution
Net-2 Net-1
PD PE PV PD PE PV
MNIST 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97
f-MNIST 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Cifar-10 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
Cifar-100 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96
TABLE V: The results between NSATP and Random in F-
measure
Net-2 Net-1
PD PE PV PD PE PV
MNIST
NSATP 9.99 10.51 10.03 7.13 5.47 5.39
Radom 908.52 918.60 900.90 144.82 136.68 135.00
Inc. 98.90% 98.86% 98.89% 95.07% 96.00% 96.01%
f-MNIST
NSATP 1.83 2.18 1.94 4.91 4.92 4.87
Radom 488.45 490.23 503.65 92.48 93.27 97.49
Inc. 99.63% 99.56% 99.61% 94.69% 94.72% 95.01%
Cifar-10
NSATP 1.94 6.89 4.26 20.43 14.98 15.01
Radom 609.31 606.19 626.15 300.14 323.44 308.96
Inc. 99.68% 98.86% 99.32% 93.19% 95.37% 95.14%
Cifar-100
NSATP 1.54 2.04 1.58 8.30 5.52 5.30
Radom 287.74 287.07 296.62 40.85 42.32 38.47
Inc. 99.46% 99.29% 99.47% 79.67% 86.96% 86.23%
examples to simulated random testing2, and select top 1000
examples of ranked example list. We collect the F-measure for
these examples on two models, four image datasets, and three
distance metrics.
Table V lists out the effectiveness of NSATP and Random
in F-Measure, for each image dataset, each distance metric,
and each model. Let us take the first cell to illustrate to
the contents. It shows that the F-Measure for NSATP and
Random on the Net-1 model, MNIST and PD metric are
2.5 and 5, respectively. It means that on average (recalling
that ten individual tests are conducted for each testing to
avoid sample bias), 2.5 and 5 payloads needed to be eval-
uated before an effective adversarial example is generated, by
NSATP and Random, respectively. We further use the Inc.
(R−AR × 100%) metric to calculate the improvements from
Random to ART4SQLi, and report Inc.= 50%. We check all
Inc. values of V and obtain they are range from 30% to 60%,
which shows NSATP is more effective than Random.
Finally, we answer Q2 as follows:
2The Eff. values of all examples are more than zero.
A2: Our method can effectively analyze the noise sensitivity
of examples, and the fitted curves based on the results
of three distance metrics are all exponential function
on each image dataset and each model.
TABLE VI: Map the curve function to the linear function
Net-1 LeNet-2
PD PE PV PD PE PV
MNIST Abs. 3.87 3.81 3.86 90.37 74.28 84.28mark Best Worst Middle Best Worst Middle
f-MNIST Abs. 3.18 3.11 3.16 13.27 10.80 12.31mark Best Worst Middle Best Worst Middle
Cifar-10 Abs. 3.87 4.00 3.95 20.76 8.88 11.46mark Worst Best Middle Best Worst Middle
Cifar-100 Abs. 1.56 1.64 1.61 8.52 5.42 6.53mark Worst Best Middle Best Worst Middle
3) Answer Q3: To answer Q3, we use Eff-D metric to
evaluate the effectiveness of the three distance metrics.
Let us take the first cell of Table III to illustrate the evalua-
tion process. We define a function z = ln y, and we use vari-
able substitution to obtain the function z = −4.64x+ ln 0.38.
We further compute the absolute derivative (z′) of z versus x,
which is 4.64. We map each function of Table III to a linear
function and compute the absolute derivative of the linear
function, summarized in Table VI. We compare the absolute
derivatives on one model and one dataset among three distance
metric, and mark the absolute derivative is maximum, middle,
minimum as Best, Middle and Worst, respectively. We find
that the probability difference has 6 “Best”, 0 “Middle” and
2 “Worst”, the probability entropy has 2 “Best”, 0 “Middle”
and 6 “Worst”, and the probability variance has 0 “Best”, 8
“Middle” and 0 “Worst”, which denotes that the probability
difference is better the other two metrics to evaluate the noise
sensitivity of examples in general.
Finally, we answer Q3 as follows:
A3: The probability difference metric is better than the
other two metrics on each image dataset and each
model.
E. Threats to validity
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity of our
experiment.
In our experiment, we train two DNN models on four image
datasets, and one perturbation modifies four (2 × 2) pixels.
Different perturbation may lead to different observations. The
perturbation strategy just modifies four pixels, but other pertur-
bation strategies are likely to modify more than four pixels.
The examples with too many noise may be easily detected
by adversarial defense mechanism. Moreover, we randomly
choose the pixels of given examples and modify them. To
enhance the observations and results, we repeat the experiment
for 3 times, and their conclusions are consistent.
Different models may have different accuracy rates with
different training strategies, and different trained models may
affect the effectiveness of our method. In our experiment, we
construct two different models and different training strategies.
The results based on these models and training strategies are
consistent.
V. RELATED WORK
Machine learning is increasingly being used for poten-
tial safety critical decisions, such as malware classfication,
autopilot system, face recognition, financial transaction &
supervision, and so on. It is essential to prevent the potential
errors from being exposed. Among all the deep learning
techniques, deep neural networks (DNNs) are one of the most
popular techniques and have shown excellent results in speech
recognition [8], [9], image recognition [10], natural language
processing [11].
Machine learning models are often vulnerable to adversarial
manipulation of their input intended to cause incorrect classifi-
cation [37]. DNNs are actually an effective data representation
of a given set of samples. A trained DNN models are highly
vulnerable to attacks based on adversarial examples with small
modifications. Szegedy et al. [22] first revealed the sensitivity
to well-tuned artificial perturbation, such perturbation image
can fool DNN models, they further observed that using ad-
versarial examples to train DNN can improve the robustness
of DNN against adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al. [23]
proposed a framework to estimate generative models via an
adversarial process, which is called generative adversarial
networks (GANs). Kurakin et al. [29] proposed basic iterative
method to generate adversarial examples, which add little
perturbation in each step. Papernot et al. [30] formalized the
space of adversaries against deep neural networks and utilize
Jacobian matrix to build adversarial saliency map to enable an
efficient exploration of the adversarial-samples search space.
Su et al [28] just modified one pixel of examples and observed
the adversarial examples can successful fool DNNs. Carlini
and Wagner [27] introduced three adversarial attacks in the
wake of defensive distillation against the adversarial pertur-
bations. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [31] proposed to compute a
minimal norm adversarial perturbation for a given image in
an iterative manner. Akhtar and Mian [26] have investigated
other adversarial attacks. Our method is to evaluate the noise
sensitivity of examples, which can work on these attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely use in nat-
ural language processing, computer vision and image recogni-
tion. Many researchers have proposed many efficient DNNs for
those applications. But, related works has show the DNNs can
be fooled by artificial examples with some perturbations and
many adversarial attack models have be proposed. However,
most of them pay little attention to the noise sensitivity of
examples.
In this paper, we have studied the correlation between the
noise sensitivity and the probability labels of examples. We
proposed a noise-sensitivity-analysis-based test prioritization
technique for deep neural networks, which evaluates the the
noise sensitivity of examples based on the probability labels
of their examples. We have conducted a controlled experiment
on two deep neural networks over four image datasets with
three distance metrics. The experimental result has confirmed
examples are sensitive to noise. Empirical results have shown
that NSATP can effective evaluate the noise sensitivity of
examples and rank the examples by their noise sensitivity,
and probability-difference distance is more effective than
probability-entropy distance and probability-variance distance.
Future work includes a thorough study on other example
datasets and deep learning models. In order to enhance the
effectiveness of our method, another future work is to validate
it on other adversarial attack models as well.
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